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L atin  A m erican  N in eteen th  C entury  
P ublic Debt: T heory and P ractice
1. In tro d u c tio n
On the eve of the F irst World W ar Latin American countries 
had accumulated public foreign debts aggregating to more than  
two billion dollars. This was not the whole of foreign invest­
ment, by any means. Total external capital was probably more 
than  four times as large, and private applications much more 
rapidly growing from the last quarter of the n ineteenth  century 
forward. W here governments had stood as virtually  the only 
borrowers a t mid-century, in their place by 1913 stood private 
railways, public utilities and other enterprises reflecting both 
direct as well as portfolio investm ent.1
The principal creditor, on both private and public account, 
was G reat B ritain. London was the financial center to which 
Latin, Americans prim arily turned. Paris, as well as Berlin, was 
much more directed to European and colonial lending and the 
pursu it of political influence. New York was to make its large 
scale debut only in the 1920s. This reliance upon B ritain  was 
especially notable for government securities. While less than  
half of total investm ent, the British share in governm ental debt 
in Latin America probably exceeded 80 percent.
Public borrowing in Latin America during the nineteenth 
century was not a tranquil and continuous process. It was char­
1 For our purposes, these orders of m agnitude will do. They come from secondary esti­
m ates th a t are flawed in known ways as estim ates of investm ent; bu t as estim ates of 
debt, the nom inal sum s are obviously closer to the m ark. See Table 1.
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acterized by discontinuity, default and differentiation. Govern­
m ental debt, like private applications, shared in the long swing 
movements of the B ritish economy and capital m arket; it could 
hardly be otherwise: after the mid-century public proceeds pro­
gressively were applied to investm ent in infra-structure, exact­
ly like direct private investm ent in such facilities.
T hat variability is p a rt of the story of the failure of most L a t­
in American sovereign borrowers to service the ir obligations 
continuously. After an  early and nearly universal experience of 
default in  the 1820s -  Brazil was an exception -  virtually  all 
Latin American countries returned  to the better graces of cred­
itors in the 1850s. Yet, by 1913 Peru  had been forced to settle 
its debt by delivering assets to a private corporation; Mexico, 
racked again by in ternal political turmoil, was on the verge of 
default once more; Brazil was to require another funding loan 
to avoid the same fate; and A rgentina had emerged only in the 
late 1890s from a painful restructuring  of its debt.
In th is paper, I hope to provide a theoretical basis for a better 
understanding of the fragility of Latin American borrowing and 
the frequency of default during the n ineteenth  century. Sec­
tion 2 focuses on th a t theory while Section 3 introduces three 
episodes of n ineteenth  century practice. Section 4 provides a 
brief conclusion.
2. T h e o r e t ic a l C o n sid e r a tio n s
It is useful to differentiate two distinct motivations for public 
borrowing. One, short-term  in character, is deficit smoothing. 
Faced w ith a tem porary shortfall in revenues or a tem porary 
increase in expenditures, a strategy of financing the deficit 
may dominate an im mediate adjustm ent. The critical determ i­
nants in the choice are the rates of time preference and of in ­
terest. So long as the former exceeds the la tter, it pays to bor­
row. The reason is th a t a more even pattern  of consumption 
dominates an irregular one.
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The second reason for public borrowing is longer term  in 
character. It is to use public credit, or guarantee, in order to 
achieve lower cost resources for investm ent purposes. In this 
instance, the public sector intervention contributes to more ef­
ficient financial interm ediation and greater investm ent. The 
greater the absence of financial m arkets, and the larger the 
role of the sta te  in direct infrastructure investm ent, the more 
extensive the need for public borrowing. Again in terest rates 
m atter, bu t this time they are to be evaluated against the re­
tu rn  from the productive application of the resources.
Figure  1: Revenue and D evelopm enta l  Borrowing 
A. R evenue  Borrowing
E x p e n d i t u r e s  
in Year  2
E x p e n d i t u r e s  
in Year 1
B. D evelopm enta l  Borrowin '
E x p e n d i t u r e s  
in Year  2
E x p e n d i t u r e s  
in Year  1
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Figure 1 helps to distinguish between these cases. Panel A 
shows revenue borrowing to smooth public expenditure be­
tween two periods. For exogenous reasons related  to some ex­
ternal shock, expenditure capability next period will be greater 
than  now, defining the initial pair, E 1; E2. Given th a t there is 
dim inishing substitution between these expenditures and th a t 
the in terest rate , m easured by the angle em anating from the 
initial equilibrium, does not exceed the m arginal ra te  of substi­
tution, there is a superior couplet, E-,*, E2* th a t can be attained. 
I t pays to borrow the difference between Ej* and E-, and repay 
it w ith in terest in the next period. But there is no perm anent 
gain in production.
In Panel B we consider development borrowing. Now there is 
a transform ation curve relating expenditure capability in the 
two periods. If there is investm ent, m easured as the difference 
between actual and potential expenditures in the first period, it 
yields a positive re tu rn  in the second. So long as the re tu rn  ex­
ceeds the in terest ra te  a t which one can borrow, it pays to in ­
crease investm ent in the first period. T hat surplus is shown in 
the figure as E2* - E2. The yield on public investm ent will liqui­
date the debt while leaving a dividend for expenditure in the 
second.
Thus far the em phasis has simply been on borrowing regard­
less of source. The need for external ra th e r th an  in ternal bor­
rowing originates in two circumstances. One is a lack of suffi­
cient in ternal resources, which may be expected to reflect itself 
in higher domestic rates of interest. The other is a need for for­
eign exchange to balance the foreign accounts. Ex post, foreign 
lending will create its own dem and for imports; th a t is one of 
the motivations for creditors to extend such credits. But ex 
ante, governments undertaking large investm ent projects also 
understood the im portance of having foreign exchange avail­
able to pay for the rails, locomotives, engineering services, etc. 
th a t were p a rt of the cost of railway construction, for example. 
Even if surplus savings were available domestically, they could 
not be applied productively in the absence of im port capacity.
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Foreign ra th e r than  in ternal borrowing sets up a dual tran s­
fer problem. F irst, governments m ust secure the required debt 
service in domestic currency. Then public authorities m ust 
convert these prim ary surpluses available for debt service into 
foreign exchange to meet their external obligations. Thus they 
m ust be able both to tax adequately to generate the fiscal su r­
plus as well as to have the capacity to transfer it abroad. An 
in ternal debt is conceptually differentiated only by its service 
in domestic currency; when it was denom inated a t issue, as gov­
ernm ents sometimes did, in gold, it is not different from a debt 
contracted in London. All the rest is a false accounting distinc­
tion, which has no additional juridical merit; foreign purchasers 
of such obligations have the same recourse to in ternational law 
and political pressure, as was exemplified in Latin America se­
veral tim es in the nineteenth century.2
Where in ternal debt potentially can be substitu ted  by domes­
tic currency issue, foreign debt cannot, if foreign exchange is 
the key necessity. Governments choose in ternal debt ra ther 
than  m onetary expansion in order to elicit voluntary savings in 
preference to an inflation tax and forced savings. In the end, 
the inflation tax can be evaded and its collection limited by pub­
lic unwillingness to accept currency. However, it is im portant 
to note th a t Latin American governments frequently had resort 
to increases in m onetary issue when faced w ith deficits. No 
Latin American country managed a perm anent conversion to 
the gold s tandard  th a t would have imposed much greater 
in ternal discipline and lesser domestic inflation. Even w ith the 
silver standard  there was a continuing depreciation vis-a-vis 
gold a t the end of the century.
External debt brought w ith it new responsibilities to earn 
foreign exchange through expanded trade. It also m eant sus­
ceptibility to external creditor pressures as well as exposure to 
varying conditions in international capital m arkets. But these 
liabilities were offset by a determ ining reality. In terest rates
2 This is another pitfall in the estim ates of foreign public debt th a t most estim ates do 
not consider.
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for foreign borrowing, high as they m ight be, were much lower 
than  those available locally. Latin American countries were 
capital poor, if resource rich. The public sector needed funds if 
it were to fulfill its role in encouraging investm ent. There was 
a fu rther effect of public creditworthiness in a ttracting  addi­
tional foreign investm ent in private activities.
Borrowing did not, and need not, always yield a happy re­
sult. M istakes of over-borrowing, and over-lending, are easily 
made when an uncertain future is a t stake. In fact, these were 
compounded by explicit fraud perpetrated  by dishonest officials 
and bankers a t the height of m arket enthusiasm . Neglecting 
those aberrations, we can consider the critical factors which in 
theory determ ine w hether resort to external public borrowing 
is likely to yield success or not.
We can formalize some of these viability conditions in more 
detail. For revenue borrowing, the critical necessity is the do­
mestic capacity to generate future revenue surpluses indepen­
dently of the contribution of the borrowed funds. By presum p­
tion, the la tte r  are prim arily directed to consumption needs. 
U nderlying such capacity m ust therefore be a cyclical reversal 
in either revenues or outlays. In the former case, it may be re­
covery in trade or, more generally, economic activity from a 
tem porary adverse shock; in the la tter, reduction of extraordi­
nary outlays on w ar can provide the necessary surplus.
Only exceptionally would a ratio of debt to revenues in ex­
cess of unity  be prudent for revenue borrowing. Firstly, optimal 
debt itse lf would be less than  the short-fall in revenue (or in­
crease in expenditure) since in future periods there would have 
to be a corresponding adjustm ent the other way. To sustain  an 
even consumption path  one cannot fully compensate for the ad­
verse shock. Secondly, such a rule allows for compensation for 
several years of below average performance, say four years of 
more than  25 percent in each year. Thirdly, subsequent service 
of the debt, a t the expense of other expenditures would rarely 
be feasible a t higher ratios. Debt service easily could reach ten 
percent of actual proceeds, given the discounts a t which securi­
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ties sold, and reallocation of ten  percent of la ter average outlays 
is a considerable task  for most governments.
For developmental borrowing, one m ust take into account 
the re tu rns achieved from public expenditure. The setting is 
thus dynamic ra th e r than  static. One solvency rule is th a t the 
ra te  of growth of public revenues exceed the in terest rate. In 
these circumstances it is even possible to achieve a stable, m ax­
imum debt-revenue ratio under conditions of continuous public 
prim ary deficits. T hat lim iting ratio would be given by d/(rg - i), 
where d is the deficit as a ratio of revenues; rg is the ra te  of 
growth of revenues; and i is the rate  of interest. A continuous 
5 percent deficit, w ith revenues growing a t 6 percent annually 
and in terest ra tes a t 4 percent, would thus transla te  into a lim ­
iting debt-revenue ratio  of 2.5. The 6 percent annual increase 
in debt -  4 percent from in terest and a 2 percent prim ary deficit 
(5 percent of revenues divided by 2.5) -  is exactly offset by the 
growth in revenues.
But as in terest ra tes rise relative to revenue growth, the lim ­
iting ratio becomes very much larger and creditors lose confi­
dence in the ability to cover progressively higher debt service 
charges tha t, in turn , are entirely financed by new debt. Here it 
becomes clear how variation in supply affects the outcome. An 
inability to continue to borrow exposes the debtor to finding re ­
sources oneself, and the former prim ary deficit m ust become a 
surplus. If the debtor cannot achieve such a surplus, then debt 
cannot be serviced even if the long-term position is stable.
If in terest ra tes exceed revenue growth, as for much of Latin 
American n ineteenth  century borrowing they did, a less de­
manding rule for stability is possible. If prim ary surpluses are 
earned to pay some fraction of debt service w ithout resort to 
borrowing to cover them , it is possible to a tta in  a stable debt- 
revenue position. We can w rite the change in the debt-revenue 
ratio as follows: AD/R = (i - r g) D/R - s, where s is now the pri­
m ary surplus as a ratio of revenues. A regular surplus of 5 per­
cent now combines w ith an in terest ra te  of 6 percent and reve­
nue growth of 4 percent to yield a stable debt-revenue ratio of
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2.5. However, note again th a t the earlier em phasis upon regula­
rity  of lending is now joined to continuity of surplus generation.
These calculations speak to the in ternal transfer problem in ­
dependently of the external. Governments, coping w ith foreign 
creditors, enjoyed no such luxury. They had to effect paym ent in 
foreign exchange. Because of non-adherence to the gold stand­
ard and hence an inconvertible currency system, the ra te  of ex­
change became a central determ inant of debt service capacity. 
When real exchange became dear, as it did when the balance of 
paym ents deteriorated, the costs of servicing the debt also rose 
and put additional stra in  upon the public sector. The same 
would not be the case when exchange ra tes deteriorated as a 
resu lt of domestic m onetary issue; for then, if governm ental rev­
enues increased proportionately, there would be the m eans to 
effect the foreign transfer. This distinction is frequently ignored 
in some narrative accounts th a t focus on the nominal rate.
As private foreign investm ent increased in im portance in the 
la tte r p a rt of the nineteenth century, its contribution to the bal­
ance of paym ents through capital inflows actually exceeded 
public sector influence. There was in addition the evolution of 
export earnings and the term s of trade th a t also played a role in 
determ ining the exchange rate. Thus the whole constellation of 
economic forces, and not only the evolution of the public sector, 
played a significant role in the ability to service foreign public 
debt once the external transfer problem is taken into account.
One can capture an im portant component of these forces, the 
balance of trade, by extending the earlier discussion to utilize 
the overall foreign capital-export ratio  as a m easure of country 
creditworthiness. Then, instead of lim iting atten tion  to reve­
nues, we can now write for the change in the foreign capital-ex­
port ratio, AKf/X = (i - r x) Kf/X - 1, where rx is the ra te  of growth 
of export earnings and t  is the trade and non-factor service su r­
plus. The evolution of the foreign capital-export ratio  thus criti­
cally depends on the relationship between in terest ra tes and 
the ra te  of growth of exports. If in terest ra tes are less than  ex­
port growth, it is possible to finance a continuing transfer of re­
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sources consistent w ith a lim iting ratio of capital to exports; if 
the reverse holds, then export surpluses m ust be generated to 
provide a m eans for servicing a t least some fraction of external 
obligations. The reason why so m any countries in Latin America 
in the n ineteenth  century had to sustain  a surplus of exports 
over im ports now becomes clearer. It is a mistake, however, to 
call this surplus an export of capital; capital export is m easured 
by a surplus on the current account as a whole, including in ter­
est paym ents, and not on the trade account alone.
These theoretical principles can be utilized to examine in clos­
er detail several features of the nineteenth century Latin  Amer­
ican experience. Before doing so, I wish to extend the distinc­
tion between revenue and developmental borrowing to serve as 
a more focused basis for in terpreting th a t history. I w ant to sug­
gest th a t default for public revenue borrowers was more prob­
able because of more easily violated lower lim its of debt-service 
capacity in the absence of an increasing revenue base. Such de­
fault would be treated  more politically in its attem pted resolu­
tion, moreover, because there was a presum ption of in ternal fis­
cal inadequacy as its cause. Debt relief would be expected be­
cause it was the best one could do, but it would bring w ith it a 
higher degree of supervision and control. Capital m arkets could 
be expected to take a dim view of new lending prospects for 
some time.
By contrast, development borrowing would be more success­
ful in perm itting the construction of an infrastructure and the 
integration of countries into an expanding world economy. De­
fault, when it occurred, would be more related to an external 
transfer problem than  an in ternal one. Its resolution would be 
associated w ith debt consolidation and extension of new credits. 
Par excellence, it was a m atter of tem porary liquidity ra ther 
than  perm anent insolvency. Economic growth could be counted 
upon to reinforce creditworthiness and capital m arkets would 
be more willing to extend new credits.
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Figure 2: Characteristics of Borrowing
Revenue
Borrowing
Developmental
Borrowing
Purpose Consumption Investm ent
Source of Repayment Reduced Future 
Expenditure
Revenue Growth
Probability of Default High Low
Renegotiation Outcomes Reduction in 
Perm anent 
Debt Service
Temporary Assistance; 
Increased Lending
Probability of Intervention High Low
Future Access to 
Capital M arkets
Im paired U nim paired
Figure 2 sets out th is differentiation in tabu lar form. It ap­
plies, as does th is discussion as a whole, to the larger global 
process of capital flow in the nineteenth  century and not to L at­
in America alone.3 But it is now necessary to square these prin­
ciples and hypotheses w ith the Latin American n ineteenth  cen­
tu ry  historical experience.
3. P r a c tic e
Three phases of nineteenth century Latin American public bor­
rowing will be considered: the initial debt contracted in the 
1820s, the crisis of the 1870s, and the Argentine and Brazilian 
defaults of the 1890s.
3 For a  more general discussion of capital flows, see Fishlow (1985a).
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a. The 1820s
Table 1 refers to the first of these historical episodes. It pre­
sents the face value of the bonds initially sold in London, the 
resources actually received, the effective ra te  of in terest and 
am ortization, and the debt-revenue ratio. The implicit debt 
service cost as a fraction of public revenues is the product of 
the last two.
Table 1: External Public Debt in the mid-1820s 
(in Millions of Pound Sterling)
Country Nominal
Debt
Realized 
Value to 
S tate3
A nnual 
In terest Service15 
on Realized Value
Nominal
Debt/Public
Revenue
A rgentina 1.0 0.6 8.6% 1.9C
Brazil 5.1 3.0d 8.4% 4.6e
Chile 1.0 0.6 8.6 % 3.2e
Mexico 5.3 2.5 8.0 % 2.2®
Peru 1.8 1.4 7.2 % 1.8
Gran Colombia 6.8 5.9f 6.9 % > 10
a After deduction of initial interest and amortization obligations.
b Interest service calculated on realized value inclusive of initial interest and amortization 
obligations, 
c 1824.
d Excludes the £ 1.5 million Portuguese loan of 1823 which Brazil accepted as a condition for 
independence. This is included in the nominal debt and in annual debt service, 
e Average 1824-25.
f Excludes any adjustment for deduction of initial interest and amortization.
Sources: Argentina: Peters (1934: 13) and Bürgin (1946: 49); Brazil: Estatísticas Históricas, Brasil 
(1987, III: 522, 540, 570); Chile: Molina (1898: 90, 107-108, 205); Mexico: Wynne (1951, II: 5-7) and 
McGregor (1847: 1167); Peru: Wynne (1951, II: 109), Marichal (1989: 28), and Bethell (1987: 243); 
Gran Colombia: Marichal (1989: 28, 30-33) and McGregor (1847: 1243, 1329).
W hat is clear from Table 1 is the high effective in terest ra te  
all Latin American governments paid for the privilege of bor­
rowing in the London m arket. The w orst in th is respect was 
Mexico, whose initial bonds, sold in 1824, fetched only fifty per­
cent of par despite firm pledges of customs duties. As a resu lt of
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a much better price on a second issue, which also retired  a 
fraction of the first at a favorable price, its average cost is 
slightly less than  Chile's. Yet, even the best borrower, Brazil, 
was handicapped by being forced to accept £ 1.5 million in Por­
tuguese obligations as a condition of independence; were th a t 
to be ignored, its term s promised a prem ium  of ju s t about dou­
ble the going ra te  on Consols of a little more th an  3 percent. No 
government could confidently expect to service resources bor­
rowed on such term s, especially when the ir prim ary use was to 
enhance inadequate revenues whose fu ture path  was far from 
positive.
But the in terest ra te  charged was still clearly much lower 
than  the costs of resources obtained locally. Rates of 2 percent 
a m onth for commercial discounts were reported in Buenos Ai­
res, and in ternal debt, despite depreciation, had to be forced on 
unwilling takers. Foreign funds perm itted consolidation of in ­
ternal accounts and an improved fiscal position. It is not acci­
dental th a t local creditors were eager to see placem ent of these 
securities to enhance likelihood of in ternal debt service, and in 
some cases, took a lead role.
Despite the precariousness of these loans, prices of Latin 
American securities nonetheless actually improved through the 
beginning of 1825. One reason was the general euphoria char­
acteristic of financial m arket peaks, in which there seems to be 
no lim it to gain. But an im portant factor was the assured ser­
vice of the bonds as a resu lt of setting aside in itial in terest and 
sinking fund charges for as much as two years. This is w hat re ­
duced realized values to the state, as shown in Table 1, so sub­
stantially. The promised premium on these investm ents was 
thus realized initially. The test of debt service from domestic 
revenues was only to come later.
All governments except Brazil failed it. One of the im portant 
reasons is found in the foreign debt-revenue ratios. These very 
much exceed the level of unity  th a t could be deemed already to 
stretch credulity. P u t another way, external debt service could 
absorb as much as a th ird  of total receipts for these countries.
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Already in difficult financial s tra its  and laboring under in ter­
nal debts as well, there was limited ability to restra in  other 
applications in favor of foreign creditors. Indeed, several coun­
tries continued to run  deficits, bu t now necessarily financed in­
ternally, and a t exorbitant cost. Argentina, not for the la st time, 
increased its inconvertible m onetary issue.
The key aspect of failure was thus lack of fiscal responsibility 
ra th e r than  unreliable access to foreign exchange. Contempo­
raries understood. When Mexico sought access to another for­
eign loan in 1827, "Alexander Baring of Baring Brothers advised 
th a t Mexico first alter its fiscal system substantively before it 
promised to honor commitments previously broken" (Tenen- 
baum  1986b: 29). Although imports fell, sometimes dram atical­
ly, w ith the lack of fu rther finance, and the additional curtail­
m ent of short-term  trade credits to im porters, Latin American 
exports experienced no equivalent contraction. Indeed, the im ­
port contraction, although prejudicing revenues by the reduc­
tion of im port duties, would have facilitated access to foreign ex­
change for debt service, had the domestic resources been at 
hand.4
But they were not. The decision to default did not come easi­
ly. There was a commitment to continued integration in the in ­
ternational economy. Colombia actually borrowed from Mexico 
to meet its April 1826 paym ent after Peru had been forced to 
miss its scheduled payment. But the Peruvian Ambassador's 
decision to reject a short-term  loan from the Paris Rothschilds 
"on the grounds th a t it would prolong the agony but not solve 
the penury of his government" looks wise in hindsight (M an­
chal 1989: 55). No salvation was a t hand in the form of addition­
al credit; domestic austerity  would have been necessary. Other 
countries were soon to follow, w ith the sole exception of Brazil.
That deviation is partially  to be explained by reference to the 
growth in revenue th a t Brazil experienced. Although initial
4 The Argentine case, where exchange ra tes rapidly deteriorated after 1826, is no ex­
ception. There was a nominal devaluation associated with resort to domestic moneta­
ry issue ra th e r th an  an external crisis.
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debt service absorbed some 30 percent of proceeds, by 1828, the 
ratio had  declined to a lower level. Brazil's lower cost of bor­
rowing made feasible its relatively high debt-revenue ratio. It 
was th a t high, one should add, because Brazil absorbed a £ 1.5 
million 1823 loan to Portugal as part of the peace settlem ent.
When it appeared th a t Brazilian service might be in te rru p t­
ed, it was possible to schedule a further loan in 1829 to relieve 
the pressure. Brazil was thus able to benefit from greater in­
ternal tranquillity  em anating from its very different path  to in ­
dependence. For other countries, by contrast, the end of the 
1820s ushered in in ternal political and m ilitary conflict which 
debilitated economic development. Mexico's lower debt-revenue 
ratio could not forestall default. Its expenditures did not allow 
for compression for repaym ent; im mediately after default on 
the foreign loan, an in ternal issue of £ 1.6 million was neces­
sary. Mexico did not have the option of return ing  to the capital 
m arket.
Consonant w ith the revenue default mode, one m ight expect 
foreign creditors to actively involve themselves in efforts to 
promote in ternal fiscal reform. Bondholders' appeals to the 
British Foreign Office for satisfaction of the ir claims were, how­
ever, not m et w ith an affirmative response. Nonetheless, a 
range of incidents and interventions characterized the period 
following default in the 1820s.
To th is subject th a t has aroused considerable debate, I wish 
to add th ree observations. One is th a t the lack of more overt 
intervention to collect outstanding debts, such as was la te r to 
appear in Turkey, Egypt and Greece, owes less to principle than  
other reasons. Specifically, there was not the same overriding 
political/strategic setting in Latin America in the 1830s as in 
the other cases. In addition, countries agreed to recognize their 
in terest arrears, albeit w ith some concession in the ir am ount 
and future in terest rates. This alleviated the losses th a t other­
wise m ight have accrued.
The second point is th a t the instances of intervention are the 
consequence of the very fiscal and political weakness th a t pre­
L atin  A m erican N in e teen th  C en tu ry  Public D ebt 37
vented countries from servicing such debts. In ternal obligations 
could and did provoke cases of representation by foreign am ­
bassadors on behalf of their citizens. The Mexican Diplomatic 
Conventions w ith the force of treaties are exemplary. It was not 
the decision to commit to in ternational integration th a t was at 
the root of the problem, nor could it be expected to resolve the 
fiscal im passe so many countries faced.
Thirdly, the actual paym ents of Latin American countries on 
the resources they received during this first episode of bor­
rowing were better arrangem ents than  they are frequently 
made out. W ith the exception of Brazil, debt service was invaria­
bly sm aller than  initially contracted as a resu lt of renegotiations 
th a t typically reduced in terest rates on in terest a rrears to three 
percent, and in some cases also reduced their outstanding a- 
mounts. Moreover, as argued above, the costs were far less 
onerous than  reliance on in ternal sources th a t were the alterna­
tive. While creditors could manage in several cases to do better 
than  the Consol rate, in others like Mexico and Peru, they did 
perceptibly worse.
The underlying problem in the 1820s was the deficiency of 
revenue borrowing. In the 1870s, during another debt crisis, 
we see an example of Latin American development borrowing 
and consequent different circumstances.
b. The 1870s
After a prolonged period in which little Latin American foreign 
borrowing was possible, most countries were able to re tu rn  to 
capital m arkets in the more buoyant in ternational conditions 
of the 1850s. But their access was limited. The purpose of most 
new loans during th a t decade was to refinance previous unm et 
obligations. D uring the next ten  years and into the first half of 
the 1870s, much larger sums were made available for the first 
time for investm ent in infrastructure. Latin American govern­
ments em barked on a developmental role, catching up w ith the 
railway revolution under direct sta te  guidance.
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The much increased borrowing -  government debt more than  
doubled in the decade between 1865 and 1875 -  left countries 
vulnerable to the long swing in the in ternational economy th a t 
saw a dow nturn in the 1870s. By 1876 eleven Latin  American 
countries were in default. But perhaps the most in teresting  as­
pect of th is period is the continuing ability of Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile to service their debts, especially in contrast to the 
case of the region's then largest debtor, Peru.
Table 2 provides some of the elements in the explanation. It 
records for these countries the m agnitude of their debt and in­
vestm ent relative to revenues and exports. Several points 
stand out.
Firstly, the successful debtors, as a resu lt of domestic eco­
nomic growth and fiscal prudence, enjoyed both favorable debt- 
revenue and debt-export ratios. Peru was much more unfavor­
able on both dimensions, w ith consequently much greater debt 
service charges both on public sector revenues as well as on n a­
tional foreign exchange earnings.
Secondly, successful debtors all enjoyed a much larger capaci­
ty to finance some of their needs internally ra th e r than  relying 
exclusively upon foreign loans. This was of special importance 
because all th ree countries experienced large increases in m ili­
ta ry  outlays th a t were predom inantly m et by domestic levies 
ra th e r th an  by foreign revenue borrowing. Each was able to 
utilize domestic m onetary issue, bearing no interest, as an im ­
portant part of finance, thereby alleviating subsequent service 
costs. Their more extensive in ternal financial capability aver­
ted any external transfer problem. Export growth slowed in all 
these countries a t the end of the 1870s after better performance 
in the earlier 1870s as Table 2 shows.5 But default did not en­
sue.
Thirdly, all of the successes had enjoyed growing revenues 
from the 1860s on. Peru's high value, non-significant s ta tis ti­
5 The Chilean aberration  is more apparent than  real. Compared to levels in the late 
1860s earnings were substantially  greater in th a t case as well.
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cally, reflects less a steady cum ulation than  a previous sharp 
decline prior to the base for the calculations. I t was relying pri­
m arily upon its seemingly inexhaustible stock of guano depos­
its to underw rite vast expenditures; it was living off its capital. 
As guano revenues became increasingly committed to debt ser­
vice, there was a corresponding effect on disposable sta te  in­
come. A ttem pted fiscal reforms, and diversification into n i­
trates, came too late.
Fourthly, countries were able to avert default despite gener­
ally higher debt-revenue ratios than  those of the 1820s. The 
reason is th a t these successful Latin American borrowers en­
joyed much better borrowing term s in the 1870s than  they had 
earlier. Issues were regularly sold w ith 5 to 6 percent coupons 
a t prices of 90. Peru is differentiated adversely in this respect 
as well. The 1872 loan of £ 22 million was a complete failure, 
w ith a public subscription of only £ 230,000. The net proceeds 
of the issue, after final placement, am ounted to £ 13 million 
(Wynne 1951, II: 119).
Capital m arkets, despite the considerable publicity attached 
to the frauds and excesses in lending to Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Paraguay and Santo Domingo in the Report of the B ritish Se­
lect Committee on Foreign Loans, were able to make distincti­
ons. The four borrowers discussed here accounted for some 70 
percent of public borrowing during the period.
The Peruvian default, th is time, is not a pure case of revenue 
borrowing come to grief as I had categorized the 1876 default 
in my earlier article, "Lessons from the Past." R ather it is bet­
te r described as a combination of consumption and poor invest­
m ent borrowing. Loan proceeds were not committed exclusively 
to refinance and current governmental outlays. The size of the 
Peruvian debt is testim ony to the weight given to attem pted 
modernization through railway construction. U ndaunted by the 
technical difficulties, or the associated cost, the Peruvian gov­
ernm ent confided in the capacities of the American contractor, 
Henry Meiggs, to construct railways into the Andes. I t was an 
expenditure, however, totally unjustified by the potential re­
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tu rns it m ight achieve. Infrastructure investm ent is not in i t­
self an assurance of successful developmental borrowing.
c. The 1890s6
A rgentina and Brazil were the largest borrowers in the next 
upsurge of lending to Latin America in the 1880s. Both experi­
enced debt service difficulties in the 1890s. Their resolution 
illum inates fu rther the distinction between revenue and devel­
opmental borrowing.
Argentina entered upon a rapid decade of development in the 
1880s. Railroad and other investm ent underwrote transform a­
tion from a pastoral into a grain economy. Foreign capital 
played an im portant part in the boom. But so did very expan­
sive in ternal credit creation. Despite large inflows of foreign ex­
change, so extensive was m onetary growth th a t A rgentina was 
forced to leave the gold standard  in 1885. By the end of the 
1880s provincial borrowing abroad was greatly stepped up to 
underw rite the creation of a new national banking system, 
whose development contributed to a more than  trebling of 
fiduciary circulation between 1887 and 1890.
E nthusiasm  for Argentine lending did not survive such in­
ternal economic policies and increasing political uncertainty. 
The Baring Panic was the last stage of waning Argentine cre­
ditworthiness, not the first. It sealed the inability to approach 
the capital m arket for new issues, and increased the impor­
tance of Argentine debt to the stability of the British, and in­
ternational, financial system.
Argentine default was therefore met by an early effort to re­
store debt service. An agreem ent w ith the Rothschild Commit­
tee led to a special Morgan issue of £ 15 million in 1891 to cover 
in terest on national obligations for a period of three years. In­
te rest would be paid by issues of the bonds; more debt would 
solve the debt problem while Argentina adjusted its fiscal and
6 This discussion is drawn from my more extensive trea tm en t in Fishlow (1989b).
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balance of paym ents disequilibrium. The la tte r stood out: the 
trade deficit in 1890 was almost th ree tim es as large as debt 
service obligations.
T hat arrangem ent did not last. A new agreem ent was reached 
in 1893 th a t substitu ted some outright debt relief. The Romero 
settlem ent reduced in terest paym ents for five years and pay­
m ents for am ortization until 1901. In the event, A rgentina 
opted to resum e full in terest paym ents a year ahead of schedule. 
By the end of the decade, A rgentina also succeeded in restoring 
convertibility of the peso a t the then m arket rate. A period of 
very rapid growth followed a t ra tes in excess of six percent a 
year. New flows of foreign capital financed something like half 
of national investment.
Several aspects of this settlem ent are w orth noting. Firstly, 
the degree of debt relief was relatively modest, confined as it 
was to the national debt and for a lim ited period. Much larger 
gains were derived by the de facto failure to service provincial 
and m unicipal debts. Argentina was a development defaulter 
whose rapid expansion of exports and thereby product and rev­
enue would give it the m eans to m eet its obligations.
Secondly, it had been the rapid reversal of capital flows and 
relatively stagnant exports between 1888 and 1891 th a t con­
tributed to the default, ra th e r than  a fiscal collapse. The 1890 
fiscal deficit was sm aller than  in any of the three previous 
years. R ather, the need to compress im ports resulted in 1891 
in an increasing deficit owing to dim inished im port customs 
duties. The recognition of the foreign exchange problem was 
also seen in the imposition of new duties collectible in gold. 
T hat gave the government direct access to foreign exchange.
Thirdly, because it was a developmental ra th e r than  a fiscal 
crisis, it required compression of imports and adjustm ent of in ­
come and wages to restore equilibrium. The real economy, and 
not only financial arrangem ents, was im portant. Once such 
m easures were underway, national credit was quickly restored. 
Government four percent bonds redeemed provincial debts ad­
vantageously, and railroad guarantees were analogously funded.
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In the Brazilian case, there was also expansion in the la tte r 
part of the 1880s. Economic circumstances were complicated by 
political changes. W ith the fall of the Em pire and the abolition 
of slavery came a large increase in the money supply and domes­
tic inflation and exchange ra te  depreciation. These domestic de­
velopments were complicated by the Baring Panic th a t dim in­
ished enthusiasm  for B ritish foreign investm ent in Latin  Ameri­
ca as a whole. But continuing good export performance enabled 
Brazil to service its foreign debt and to extend its domestic ex­
pansion until la ter in the decade. Two loans were floated in 
1893 and 1895 a t five percent, and the la tte r at a price of 85.
The m agnitude of the exchange rate  depreciation imposed 
monetary discipline from 1892 forward. But it was to take full 
effect only in 1898. As a resu lt of deterioration in the balance of 
paym ents Brazil, well after Argentina, contracted a funding 
loan th a t consolidated debt, postponed am ortization and finan­
ced continuing in terest payments. One of the conditions of the 
arrangem ent was a more spartan  economic policy. Correspond­
ing to external finance, it was necessary to reduce domestic 
monetary issue. Unlike A rgentina in 1891, Brazil complied, 
ushering in a deflationary period th a t lasted until 1902.
Brazilian growth thereafter was rapid and benefitted from 
an expanding in ternational economy and foreign investm ent. 
But the real story was a rise in value of exports of 5.4 percent a 
year in value term s, but only 0.1 percent in volume. Under the 
impulse of an excess supply of coffee, Brazil sustained a diver­
sification into the industrial sector in the pre-W ar years.
Brazil's 1898 Funding Loan provided for no in terest ra te  re­
lief. While it stressed in ternal economic policy, the focus was 
much more on the exchange rate  than  upon fiscal revenues. 
Brazil's fiscal capacity is amply indicated by the capacity to live 
up to the Rothschild agreement, generating surpluses adequate 
to retire m onetary issue. New sales taxes and ta riff collections 
in gold contributed to such an achievement.
But the principal point to emphasize again is the central role 
of the balance of paym ents in provoking crisis and leading re­
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covery. But unlike the case of Argentina, capital m arket in s ta ­
bility played no role in the outcome. It was cyclical dem and for 
coffee coupled w ith its oversupply, th a t did in Brazil.
This comparison of the two cases also clarifies another issue. 
Adjustm ent of the Argentine and Brazilian economies was ne­
cessitated not exclusively because of foreign lending, but be­
cause they were integrated into the world economy through 
trade as well. Although Brazil m anaged access to the capital 
m arket, and never actually defaulted, while A rgentina did, 
Brazil nonetheless had to undergo a painful adjustm ent during 
the M urtinho years. Lending could and did exaggerate suscep­
tibility to external shocks, but perhaps above all, it gave consid­
erable la titude for expansionary domestic policy th a t too, was a 
prime factor in the eventual cyclical decline before the next 
wave of recovery.
4. C o n c lu sio n
The nineteenth  century covers long periods of Latin American 
indebtedness and default. W hat we have seen is th a t they were 
not of common cause nor identical consequence. Early on, coun­
tries sought foreign help to finance their current public expend­
itures; this unfortunate beginning continued for some countries 
virtually to century's end. But for others, the beginning of ra il­
way and other public investm ents afforded an opportunity for 
increased investm ent and expansion. This development bor­
rowing helped to finance the needed expenditures for public and 
private provision of infrastructure. Failure was not excluded, 
but when it occurred, it was resolved faster and more effective­
ly than  was the case of revenue borrowing.
Indeed, more effectively than  we have seen in recent years. 
The rhythm s of an expanding global economy, w ith free-trade 
B ritain a t its  center, in conjunction w ith attentive investm ent 
banks, smoothed over the problems of developmental borrowers
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afflicted by growing pains. In the 1980s alas, the slow response 
of the industrial countries to Latin America's debt problem has 
complicated recovery. Ironically, despite the extensive positive 
in ternal reforms th a t have been accomplished throughout the 
region, prospects for the next century still rem ain in doubt. 
History provides a useful perspective on the present.
